Wednesday, January 18, 2012

The Hedge Fund Mirage


The recently published book The Hedge Fund Mirage: The Illusion of Big Money and Why It's Too Good to Be True (Wiley, 2012) is worth a long look.  Based on the book's table of contents and a quick read of the first chapter, author Simon Lack's work is a calm, measured exposé.  (Sample, later subchapters regarding investment costs:  Fees on Top of More Fees and How to Become Richer Than Your Clients.)

A Bloomberg article about the book is here.

Prior posts about hedge fund costs are here (More about Hedge Funds, Their Costs, and Their Net Investment Returns) and here (Bloom Off Hedgies' Roses).

     

Wednesday, January 11, 2012

An Additional Unfortunate Legacy of the 2008 Financial Crisis


Here's an excellent short Bloomberg piece by William Cohan:  How Wall Street Turned a Crisis Into a Cartel.

Mr. Cohan, a former banker at a Brand Name investment bank, touches on a nugget of Wall Street history to make his points well - particularly about how the Brand Names price their services.  If you'd like to take Wall Street history several steps farther please check out the book Every Man A Speculator (HarperCollins, 2005) by Steve Fraser.  Fraser's book, remarkably thorough and well-researched, provides a perspective about Wall Street that mostly is absent from current public policy discussions about the vices and virtues of bulge bracket American finance.

Wednesday, December 21, 2011

Selected Recent Articles as 2011 Ends


Wal-Mart & Merrill Lynch Settle 401(k) Fee Lawsuit (Pensions & Investments)

In this lawsuit Wal-Mart is alleged to have caused 1.2 million participants -- current and former employees -- in the Wal-Mart 401(k) plan to bear the cost of excessive fees.  The allegedly excessive fees include monies collected by Merrill Lynch, the plan's trustee, from mutual fund companies with high cost funds provided to plan participants.

In the settlement, which requires court approval, participants will not receive any of the $13.5 million settlement proceeds directly.  Also noteworthy are that prescriptive measures are indefinite.  For example, low-cost passively managed funds will be added to plan offerings "when appropriate."

The alleged facts and the lawsuit are ironic given Wal-Mart's legendary hard-nosed, cost-cutting dealings with merchandise vendors.


Hedge Funds Have Had a Not Good Year  (The Economist) 

"The average hedge fund has fallen by around 9% this year; the S&P 500 has fallen by just 3.4%."  A personal point of view:  over the truly long run, and on average after adjusting for survivorship, backfill, and other statistical biases, hedge funds will underperform a diversified portfolio of indices by the amount by which their all-in management and investment, etc. costs exceed the all-in equivalent costs of such indices.


How Accurate are Published Hedge Fund Performance Reports?  (Investment News)

This article (subscription required) reports on criticism of "emerging" hedge funds' performance studies - unfortunately relied upon to an extent by institutional investors and their consultants - because those studies don't account for survivorship and backfill biases.


Public Pensions' Misplaced Faith in Private Equity (NYT)

"Public pensions pay billions in fees to private equity.  The question is whether it is worth it."


Vanguard Passes iShares in Bond ETF Duel (Rick Ferri)

Further to an earlier post here about how Vanguard is taking ETF market share from Black Rock's iShares because of Vanguard's lower costs, Rick Ferri notes a milestone:  the Vanguard Total Bond Market ETF now has more assets than the iShares Barclays U.S. Aggregate Bond Fund, having overtaken the iShares fund as of December 1st.  Heightening the greater net inflows to the Vanguard fund are today's lower fixed income yields, which magnify the Vanguard costs advantage.


 Indexing Revolution Opens New Front: Bonds (Bloomberg)

This informative Bloomberg article notes how active bond-fund managers are just beginning to lose assets under management to passive bond funds.  The article notes that eight out of ten bond-fund managers have underperformed the U.S. market over the past 20 years.  Notable quotes:  "Bond index funds have been the unsung heroes in the index wars," said Dan Wiener, chairman of Adviser Investments.  "I think you're going to see a huge movement into indexation of bonds - much lower fees," said BlackRock CEO Laurence Fink.

Happy Holidays! 
   

Monday, November 14, 2011

Private Equity Fee Whack-A-Mole


In this week's The Economist an interesting article observes how some private equity firms are responding to (overdue) pricing pressure that's reducing their formerly-standard "2 and 20" fees.  The article is based on a November 2011 report by the Dechert LLP law firm and Preqin Ltd., an information service provider primarily to funds and fund investors.

The take-away is that various types of transaction fees and monitoring fees charged to portfolio companies by their private equity firm "keepers" have been increasing recently, on average, particularly after the 2008-2009 financial crisis.

The "keepers" also collect separate fees from a portfolio company undergoing a transaction subsequent to becoming a portfolio company, such as the sale of a company division or a debt financing or refinancing with an unaffiliated lender or lenders. 

It's reasonable for private equity firms to be compensated for their professionals' time and efforts, of course.  (Most transaction fees are charged based on "deal size"; monitoring fees are often based on the portfolio company's EBITDA.)  And so whether the fees paid are fair is mostly a question of degree.  And, importantly, how the fees are allocated between the private equity firm-affiliated general partner of the fund that owns some or all of the portfolio company and the fund's limited partners.  The report notes that of the private equity firms responding to the survey used to prepare the report, approximately 20% allocate "all or a significant portion" of collected fees to the private equity firm or its affiliate.  

Please click here for the article and here for the report.

Thursday, October 13, 2011

If It Bleeds (an Investor) It Leads


Zig Ziglar quips that hurricanes and earthquakes get the headlines but termites do more damage than hurricanes and earthquakes combined.

The number of car accident fatalities in Texas in an average month is the equivalent loss of life as the crash each month of a full commercial airliner with the loss of all aboard.  Who doubts that if a full commercial airliner crashed in Texas monthly there would be a public outcry for immediate improved aviation safety?  But where’s the public outcry about the tragedies on the state’s roads?

News coverage of a billionaire often is solely about his or her wealth.*  A billionaire has one hundred times the wealth of a person with a net worth of ten million dollars.**  However, press coverage about the billionaire's wealth is orders of magnitude more than the difference in wealth between the two people.

The point: visibility distorts proportionality in public attention. So do precipitousness and conflict.

Reading business and financial news can leave the impression that nearly everyone and their brother -- especially if perceived as sophisticated -- are investing in private equity, hedge funds, commodities, other “alternatives,” and complicated trading strategies.  And frequently stock picking and trading, selecting the "best" investment managers, playing the IPO market, and the like. For example, the NYT’s “Dealbook” -- which has excellent content, by the way -- has the latest and greatest on these topics: private equity, hedge funds, M&A, securities offerings, investment banking, and venture capital. There’s drama with these topics: triumph, failure, redemption, and other sagas.  And adrenaline rushes.  Heat; smoke; sizzle.

So-called passive investing -- low cost, index fund investing -- by contrast is boring. Losing or making a fortune quickly with index investing is difficult.*** Where’s the excitement -- the news -- in that?  A typical person perusing mass-market financial publications would think that index investing isn't in the game.

But it is.  $6 trillion is invested in indexed assets, representing a value increase of almost 25% last year.  And the trend for indexing is good, especially for institutional investors seeking worldwide equity exposure.  Reasons for the trend include lower risk, a desire for liquidity, the avoidance of subpar active performance, and, of course, the cost advantage.  "Nothing is cheaper than beta exposure, delivered through index funds."

 
The more attention an investment class receives from the financial press the more lucrative that class is for "financial services industry professionals" (or, to use Warren Buffett's word, "helpers").  And the less likely the class is to produce acceptable, risk-adjusted returns in the long term.

A prediction:  in not too many years the great debate about active management versus indexing will have evolved.  The two opposing viewpoints will then be whether investment return optimization is achieved via indexing as the core strategy, complemented by other investment strategies, or whether indexing is the only strategy.

 
______________
*"Famous for being rich" is a variant of today's "famous for being famous."

**The common reference to a natural person's "net worth" is unfortunate. It's as if a person's character or value can be expressed in a single dimension by a single measurement. How about substituting the term “balance sheet net worth”?

*** The word “quickly” in this sentence makes all the difference:  it’s easier to make a fortune, over the long haul, with low-cost indexing than with alternatives.



Monday, August 29, 2011

Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It (Reprise)

Louis Brandeis' book Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It is a short unflattering critique of the American banking system in the early 1900s.  The book, published before Brandeis became Justice Brandeis in 1916, is a gem.  Some of the financial reforms for which Brandeis advocated in the book came to pass through Depression-era legislation, making a chapter here and there outdated.  But the majority of the text and the financial prescriptions therein are eerily still very relevant today.  (The more things change ... .)

Three short observations.  First, it's interesting to read about the machinations a century ago of direct lineage predecessors of some of today's Name Brand financial services firms.  Makes one think mischievous behavior can be in "banking DNA."

Second, readers familiar with current financial regulation may come away with the sense that the current American financial regulatory apparatus is like a very old house that has been remodeled badly over and over.  Third, some of the underwriting commissions and share dilution Brandeis describes are breathtakingly confiscatory of investors' capital.

Sunday, August 14, 2011

Mutual Funds are for Fish


An excellent op-ed on the undesirability of actively managed mutual funds is in today's NYT.  The op-ed, by Yale CIO David Swensen and available here, explains how most mutual funds companies' rich fees, other high costs, and excessive portfolio trading -- and investors' "chasing performance" -- lead inexorably to poor investment results.

The op-ed touches on the Morningstar study blogged about here last August.  The study shows that a given fund's investment costs -- principally its expense ratio -- are the best predictor of the fund's investment performance.  Simply put, low costs predict favorable future investment performance better than any other fund characteristic.

The op-ed continues a theme for Swensen, who has commented frequently that mutual funds are undesirable.  In today's op-ed he refers to for-profit mutual fund companies as parasitic.  Let me describe the situation similarly:  mutual funds are for fish.

Swensen suggests three fixes.  The first is self-help, taking control of one's investments and sticking to low cost index funds such as those from Vanguard.  The second and third suggested fixes call for SEC action.

Let me suggest that the first fix is far and away the best remedy.  Let's call it "caveat investor," which translates as "let the investor beware":  do not give your money, hard-earned or otherwise, to actively managed mutual funds.

* * * * *

The Seeking Alpha version of the above post is available here should you want to read the 30+ comments.

Monday, July 25, 2011

Pressure on Investment Advisers' Fees Expected Due to Additional Transparency: SEC-Registered Advisers' Full Forms ADV Must Now Be Online


Due to a recent rule change, SEC-registered investment advisers' full Forms ADV are now publicly available online.  Before the change Part 2 of an SEC-registered investment adviser's Form ADV was not required to be publicly available online.  Importantly, an adviser's fee schedule appears in Part 2.
 
As a result of the rule change investors and investors' consultants may now more easily "comparison shop" prospective and incumbent advisers based on cost.

An Investment News article about the change is available here.  (Free registration required.)  The article explains the change and explores possible competition-enhancing consequences.       

Rick Ferri of Portfolio Solutions LLC is quoted in the news article.  Portfolio Solutions LLC specializes in creating balanced portfolios of low-cost index funds.  (By the way, Rick writes an excellent blog under the tag-line "Lower Your Investment Costs."  A link to the blog is available here.  I first became aware of Rick when reading his blog posts that also appear as his contributed updates to LinkedIn's Vanguard Networking Group.)   

Rick's points in the Investment News article include that the new public availability of fee schedules gives low cost adviser firms like his a new competitive advantage and may facilitate ranking of adviser firms by fee schedules in addition to rankings based on conventional measures such as assets under management.  One suspects Rick believes a ranking by fees would be a good thing.  Agreed.

Thursday, May 19, 2011

New Rule Curbs Investment Banker Abuses Associated with New Equity Issues; LinkedIn & FINRA Rule 5131(d)(1)


Most of this blog is about reducing investment costs by lowering transaction and other costs associated with acquiring exposure to equity returns. Today's post is about opposite way transactions: lowering a company's cost of equity capital by minimizing the value a company transfers when selling its equity for cash ... or in other words maximizing the cash a company receives in exchange for a given percentage of its equity.

Today was LinkedIn's first day as a publicly-traded company. LinkedIn's share price increased substantially from the initial public offering price. The large increase makes timely a short discussion about a provision in a new rule from FINRA, the self-regulatory organization for American securities firms: Rule 5131.

FINRA Rule 5131 addresses several abuses (FINRA's word, not mine) in the new equity issues market. The rule is many years in the making. The rule has its origin in the May 2003 report and recommendations of the NYSE/NASD IPO Advisory Committee, a committee formed at the SEC’s request. The report’s introduction states why the committee was formed: “[i]n recent years … public confidence in the integrity of the IPO process has eroded significantly.” According to FINRA, "the new rule is intended to sustain public confidence in the initial public offering (IPO) process ... ." Note FINRA's use of the word "sustain" rather than the more natural "increase"; avoiding the latter word avoids connotations of present insufficiency. No comment.

Most of the new rule's provisions take effect on May 27, 2011, which probably not coincidentally is more or less when the traditional equity offerings season pauses for the summer.

The new rule addresses several areas of banker abuse. Most of the trade press and law firm memoranda about the new rule focus on paragraph (b), which effective September 26, 2011 will prohibit prophylatically what is known as "spinning." "Spinning" is an investment bank's allocation of new issue shares to current and certain former and prospective directors and executive officers of the bank's clients. As a practical matter paragraph (b) will make it difficult but not impossible for public company directors and executive officers to receive IPO allocations.

Other paragraphs of the rule deal with prohibiting kickbacks associated with IPO allocations (... really, does FINRA need a new rule for that?) and with new issue "flipping."

Because the rule's provisions are aimed at banker abuses all have as their purpose -- indirectly at least -- reducing banker fees and commissions. Paragraph (d)(1), however, is aimed at reducing investment costs more directly.

Paragraph (d)(1) requires that in handling a new equity issue the "book-running" lead underwriter regularly provide the prospective public company with regular report of indications of interest (i.e., interest in purchasing the company’s shares), including the names of interested institutional investors and the number of shares indicated by each. Paragraph (d)(1) also requires that the report to the company include aggregate demand from retail investors.

The concept behind paragraph (d)(1) is that the prospective public company needs the information in those reports -- especially the most recent report -- to learn about the demand for its shares. With that knowledge, so goes the concept, the company can reduce the huge information advantage the underwriter has over the company when, after the IPO roadshow is over, it’s time to negotiate (or "price") the offering.

Rule 5131(d)(1) is written generally, without specifics. The generality creates many loopholes benefiting investment banks. A practice pointer: a going-public company should incorporate Rule 5131(d)(1) into its engagement letter with its prospective lead underwriter(s) but with specifics that eliminate the loopholes.

Even with the company's awareness of the Rule 5131(d)(1) information the underwriter's advantage is unfair. The reason for the unfairness: a prospective public company dissatisfied with the underwriter's view of an initial public offering price has few alternatives, even fewer of which are practical, to acceding to the underwriter's view about price.

And so the underwriting agreement is then signed, memorializing the negotiated initial public offering price. And then it's off to the races: the public offering occurs and the share price increases substantially during the first trading day. The company has left substantial money on the table; the value held by its pre-offering shareholders has been diluted unnecessarily.

Back to LinkedIn:  determining an initial public offering price is a commercial contract negotiation between the prospective public company and its investment bank underwriter.  Notions of fiduciary duties and the underwriter as an advisor are inapplicable.  Judging by results -- and despite the success to date of LinkedIn’s business and the headlines and euphoria over its IPO -- LinkedIn negotiated poorly.

* * * * *

Addendum:  subsequent to the post above the NYT's Joe Nocera wrote a column questioning whether LinkedIn was "scammed" by its investment bankers.  Joe's NYT colleague Andrew Ross Sorkin then weighed in with a short opinion piece politely begging to differ with Joe's column.  Andrew's view is that although the investment bankers could have done better he doesn't believe that in this instance the investment bankers were scamming.

Saturday, April 30, 2011

More about Hedge Funds, Their Costs, and Their Net Investment Returns


Last month we blogged here about changes in the prospects for hedge funds.  Following-up on that post, an excellent, general overview column by Scott Burns about hedge funds, their costs, and their average net returns is available here.

A prediction:  the remarkable growth in the hedge fund business over the last two decades will prove to be a generation-long fad.  There's ten more years or so to go.  Most hedge funds will close.  A very few will thrive by exploiting market anomalies.  Some will evolve into other types of high-priced financial services firm.

After more high-profile closures -- resulting from lackluster returns or, worse, blow-ups -- institutional investors will become reluctant to allocate capital to hedge funds.  And investment policy allocation percentages for hedge funds will be substantially smaller that what those percentages are in 2011.          

Economic Growth (Off Topic)


The economics profession has lost its way.

Economists generally believe that “growing the economy” depends largely on the proper mix of the "ingredients" of fiscal policy, monetary policy, and tax policy, etc.  And a few other ingredients, all policy-based.

And so economists’ prevailing wisdom is that economic doldrums result from not having enough of this or that policy ingredient.  Or that a given policy ingredient was added to the economic stew too soon, too late, or out of sequence.

If the economics profession were an emperor then although he had clothes previously he has no clothes now.

Although fiscal policy, monetary policy, and tax policy, etc. can set the stage for economic growth -- and while ill-advised fiscal, monetary, and tax policies can seriously hinder economic growth -- those policies are not the primary ingredient for economic growth.

The primary ingredient for economic growth is advancement in science, engineering, and technology.

In years gone by this primary ingredient was part of the economic discussion.  But consideration of its contributions has dropped away, little by little, over time.

Why?  Probably because discussion about this primary ingredient doesn’t fit well with the economic curriculum of our times.  (If the only tool one has is a hammer then every problem looks like a nail.)

Economists constantly predict GDP growth: “it should be in a tight range of x% to y% for full year 2011.”

Really?  Except in the same way that economists have predicted "seven of the last five recessions" how can economists predict GDP with accuracy given the large contribution to GDP growth resulting from unknowable future advances in science, engineering, and technology?

* * * * *

Addendum:  Yale Economics Professor Robert Shiller, writing in an Economic View column published in The New York Times on May 1, 2011, states that "[t]oday, our prosperity depends on finance, and on its associated disciplines of accounting and macroeconomics."  This blogger's view is very different.

Sunday, April 3, 2011

Providing for Disclosures of Conflicts of Interest in Investment Bank Engagement Letters


In the wake of the Del Monte shareholder litigation -- previously blogged about here -- a prominent Wall Street law firm is urging corporations to request that M&A advisor candidates disclose existing and potential conflicts of interest prior to selection and engagement.  From the view here, such disclosure at the time of engagement would best be memorialized in a representation from the advisor.  Ongoing disclosure would occur pursuant a covenant from the advisor.

The law firm is known for, among other things, tenacious advocacy of the business judgment rule's protection of corporate directors.  The firm is urging the disclosure in the context of commenting on how corporate directors should oversee investment bank advisors.

Investment bank contracts typically require clients/customers to acknowledge and accept -- in extremely broad language -- any and all conflicts of interest, whether present or future, identified or non-identified.  So it will be interesting to see if the law firm's urging gets traction and results in a change in what is "standard" (or "market") in M&A advisor engagement letters.  

Can advisors' conflict of interest disclosures reduce the overall costs businesses pay to investment bank advisors?  By reducing conflicts of interest, bringing to light biases resulting from conflicts of interest, or both:  the answer is yes.

Saturday, March 12, 2011

Bloom Off Hedgies' Roses


One investor's decision to exit a business does not a trend make.  However, when the investor is prominent and in the glam and lucrative world of hedge funds, and the decision isn't due to his retirement, then the investor's decision may involve more than meets the eye -- and if not a trend then maybe the beginning of a trend.

News available here observes that sophisticated investors increasingly are questioning whether hedge funds, on average and over time, justify the investment capital they receive.  Investors are spending more time reviewing and questioning fees paid to the funds' managers.

"Hedge funds are a great business ... ... for hedge fund managers."  (I don't remember the source of the quote but believe it to be Burton Malkiel.)

Narratives will emerge stating that the average hedge fund's fading bloom is due to Dodd-Frank regulation which indirectly reduces investment returns.  Because those narratives will often have an agenda behind them, here's a suggestion:  be politely skeptical about that causation explanation. 

Sunday, March 6, 2011

Folio Investing's Views on the Benefits of Reducing Investment Costs


Folio Investing is an innovative, unorthodox online brokerage firm founded by former SEC Commissioner Steve Wallman.  At the SEC, Steve was a leading advocate for the change to "decimalization," among other reforms.  "Decimalization" is the notion that stocks should be quoted and traded based on dollars and cents prices rather than dollars and dollar fractions prices (e.g., "7 and 7/8ths").  The reduced "spreads" that resulted from "decimalization" continue to save investors significant sums.

Just a guess:  Steve designed Folio Investing based on his observations -- accumulated over years -- about what online brokerage firms should be doing but weren't.  Many of the Folio Investing site's features are well thought out, resulting in fewer clicks and less time to get done what one wants to get done.  Folio Investing is in some ways like a Mac computer in a world in which other online brokerage firms are PCs.  We've been Folio Investing customers for several years and recommend the firm's services.

To get back on topic:  Folio Investing's views about investment costs can be read here.  Those views are reflected in the firm's ultra-low costs, which add to the value the firm provides its customers.  

Sunday, February 20, 2011

Investment Banks Have Conflicts of Interest? (Was World War II A Conflict?) - Part II


Last April I blogged here about personal experiences in two M&A deals in which investment bankers' hunger for fees transformed potential conflicts of interest into actual conflicts of interest.  The actual conflicts of interest motivated bankers to engage in questionable conduct in one deal and deceptive conduct in another.

Those two example deals, which just scratch the surface of the ways enterprising investment bankers can think of to collect fees, occurred before the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank reform acts and the sweeping public criticism of American investment banking in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.  Recent news suggests anecdotally that investment banker behavior hasn't improved -- and won't improve* -- when advisory fees and financing fees are in the offing:  the Delaware Chancery Court's opinion (available here) in the Del Monte Foods Company shareholder litigation tells a remarkable short story of a Name Brand Investment Bank's use of deception against its own client, of a Name Brand Private Equity Sponsor's aiding and abetting the sleight-of-hand, and of the client's board's accommodation of both Name Brand firms.

That accommodation was part witting and part unwitting. 

Quantifying the increased investment costs indirectly borne by a company's shareholders as a result of the company's banker's conflicts of interest -- which in many situations is classic principal-agent non-alignment -- is difficult.  But those costs are often significant.   

*Investment banker conflicts of interest in M&A arguably have increased since the 2008 financial crisis including because the fewer number of surviving Name Brand Investment Banks has resulted in more situations involving potential or actual conflicts of interest among those banks' clients. 

Friday, December 31, 2010

Movement to Reduce Investment Costs Accelerates

Selected recent articles follow.  Happy New Year!

This NYT article suggests that conditions are favorable for private equity investors to get better terms from buyout firms, many of which are on the ropes - as this article in The Deal relates - and in dire need of "new money."  Management fees and carried interest compensation are specifically targeted for reform.  Reducing the "drag" on investment returns resulting from overpaying private equity GPs continues a trend of lowered fees.  Preqin, an investment research firm that focuses exclusively on so-called alternative assets, reports that in 2009 management fees for new funds of more than $1 billion dropped by 17% from a year earlier, according to the NYT.

Low cost index fund portfolios continue to outperform most managed portfolios, as columnist Scott Burns updates us here.  But wait, there's more!  The WSJ reports that new types of index funds - let's call them index funds 2.0 - are in the works that will be even more difficult for active money managers to outperform.  In particular, these "next-year's-model" index funds will be less susceptible to being taken slight advantage of through others' front-running.

Employers recovering from financial crisis-induced panic attacks that led to the elimination of 401(k) matching contributions are beginning to restore those matches.  The restoration is often on a phased-in basis that reflects caution.  Scott Burns observes in this column that low costs can be as valuable to your 401(k) account as an employer matching contribution.  Who knew?  Here's an instructive how-to article on bolstering your 401(k) account returns by lowering the costs borne by your account.  (The article quotes David Loeper, the author of a great book extolled in a prior post.)

Best wishes for personal health (and what else really matters?) and healthy investment returns for the coming decade.

Tuesday, December 14, 2010

Vanguard in ETF Ascendancy at BlackRock's Expense

The Vanguard Group is taking ETF market share from BlackRock, Inc. at a significant pace.  Vanguard is doing so primarily through investor sensitivity to cost - that is, the lower expense ratios of Vanguard ETFs compared to category-equivalent iShares ETFs from BlackRock.  According to a Pensions & Investments article, the competitive cost pressures that Vanguard and others are bringing to bear could cost BlackRock approximately $400 million in annual revenue.  Unfortunately for BlackRock there's minimal expense savings to offset that evaporating revenue.

BlackRock identified the risk of "the impact of increased competition" in its public disclosures.  However, one wonders what weight BlackRock gave to the possibility of hyper-intense cost competition with Vanguard and others when BlackRock agreed last year to buy the iShares funds business from Barclays for $15 billion in cash and stock

Sunday, October 17, 2010

Investors Increasingly Focused on Investment Costs

Recent news articles and Vanguard's marketing efforts indicate that investors increasingly are focusing on investment costs.

This USA Today article discusses TD Ameritrade's decision to allow customers to trade -- commission-free -- more than 100 exchange traded funds, from several providers.  The decision follows Schwab's announcement of commission-free trades for several Schwab in-house ETFs.  Morningstar notes in this article that Vanguard has lowered the minimum initial investment for Admiral class shares, which have a very low expense ratio, of many of Vanguard's in-house funds.  Vanguard also has lowered to $10,000 from $100,000 the minimum initial investment for Admiral class shares of Vanguard's broad equity market index fund.  This Motley Fool article shares the news that Vanguard has overtaken Fidelity as America's largest mutual fund company and compliments Vanguard for having done so "the right way," with low fees.  The Motley Fool article goes on to say that "fund fees matter ... ."

Recent Vanguard marketing campaigns have highlighted the Vanguard cost advantage ("... we offer our mutual funds at cost ...").  These campaigns act on the conclusion of this Vanguard research paper (Costs matter:  Are investors voting with their feet?) that a fund's lower costs correlate with higher net cash inflows to the fund.

Book Review: The Big Investment Lie by Michael Edesess

In The Big Investment Lie (Berrett-Koehler Publishers 2007), Michael Edesess provides a revealing, comprehensive, insider's view of the investment advice business.  The business' foundation is what Edesess calls "the big investment lie":  the widely-held view -- reinforced through carpet-bombing marketing -- that professional active investment management provides clients with value. 

Edesess' mathematician background provides perspectives and insights.  His "math logic," experience in the investment advice business, and detailed research will lead you to think again about the risk-adjusted, net-of-costs performance - past or likely future - of that Name Brand Financial Advisor (as seen on TV!) or that all-outward-signs-indicate-success alternative investments firm.  The book's endnotes are very helpful and further drive home the author's points.

A guess:  deciding to title the book The Big Investment Lie was not easy.  The title, although attention-catching, may have detracted from the book's greater acceptance because the title and a description of "the lie" itself are first stated without predicate.  (The first sentence of the jacket's inside front cover doesn't mince words:  "The investment advice and management industry is built on fraud:  the idea that professional advisors can predictably and consistently help you get a better rate of return on your investments.")  Many prospective readers may have thought the idea preposterous and read no further.  And others may have concluded that the book must be enough out of the mainstream that it can't be serious.  But the book absolutely is serious, and very worthwhile.   

Two observations:  first, the book's overarching skepticism about investment professionals is not uplifting reading.  But please persevere:  the skepticism is well-founded and healthy for investment success.  Second, portions of the book read like an atonement for Edesess' years in the business.

I enthusiastically recommend The Big Investment Lie.  It's an excellent, practical guide for someone considering a relationship with a financial advisor, stockbroker, or investment manager, and alternatives to that relationship.

Sunday, September 5, 2010

Portfolio Construction the Easy Way: Excellent Performance Expectancy Including Due to Low Costs

A recent Scott Burns article identifies broad-based, low cost index funds that are excellent portfolio "building blocks."  A link to the article appears here.

Burns mentions that cost competition among Schwab, Fidelity, and Vanguard continues to make constructing one of the portfolios he suggests less and less costly.  Which brings to mind Vanguard founder John Bogle's remark that  "in investing, you get what you don't pay for."

Sunday, August 15, 2010

The Best Predictor of Fund Performance

A desire to know the future is universal and ages-old.  In matters involving human behavior, attempts to fulfill that desire are - unfortunately - unrewarding.

Something in our brains desires to know what will happen in markets, which are driven by human behavior, and desires to hear the views of people who are supposed to (or who profess to) have foresight. But unless one likes being wrong often - or can profit from predicting, notwithstanding outcomes - one shouldn't predict the stock market. The best response to the constant question of what the stock market "will do" is J. Pierpont Morgan's response: "it will fluctuate." Over the truly long term equity prices tend to rise; except for that tendency equity market moves are mostly noise and little signal. And what is noise and what is signal is inherently indiscernible.

As a result, predicting stock market direction is folly. So is giving credence to those who do. Columnist Scott Burns: "All we can do is cultivate flexibility, diversify our savings and share as little of our return as possible with those who claim to know the future." [Emphasis added.]

Do not invest in actively managed mutual funds including because their underpinning is their managers' supposed ability to predict stock winners. Actively managed mutual funds are for fish.

Those who believe in fund managers' supposed predictive abilities - and who consider actively managed mutual funds fitting vehicles to share the gains resulting from those abilities - are advised to consider new data from Morningstar (linked below). The data yield an interesting conclusion that may not be intuitive but which follows from the points of view above. That conclusion isn't that the best predictor of mutual fund performance is a manager's track record, tenure, or education, or a fund's "fund family" or "investment style," etc. The best predictor is one simple data point: a fund's expense ratio.

http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=347327&page=1

Addendum 8/29/10:  a NYT article about the same Morningstar data is linked below:

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D06EEDD1139F937A2575BC0A9669D8B63&ref=tara_siegel_bernard

Sunday, August 8, 2010

A Trend: Public Plans Reducing Investment Management Fees

http://www.pionline.com/article/20100726/PRINTSUB/307269980

What is not yet apparent is whether fee reductions through renegotiation reflect (1) a better realization of the value of active investment management, (2) a need to reduce expenses due to decreased asset values due, in turn, to the financial crisis, or (3) another reason or reasons, either alone or in combination with the foregoing two reasons.

Saturday, August 7, 2010

Two Recent Studies Conclude that Private Equity Managers' Fees are (1) Misaligned with PE Investor Returns and (2) Surprise! ... Excessive


The Economist describes two new studies on the misalignment of PE managers' fees and PE investor returns:

http://www.economist.com/node/16702073?story_id=16702073

Both studies conclude that PE manager compensation, as conventionally structured, is excessive by a number of analytical measures. And one of the studies takes matters further: according to The Economist, the study's author believes that some PE funds' internal rates of return are less than advertised.

One study, by Peter Morris, a former Name Brand Bank banker, is behind a pay wall and will set you back 25 pounds sterling. The other study, by Shahin Shojai et al., is available for free download via SSRN. Citations to both studies appear at the end of The Economist article.

Most of The Economist article's "reader comments" are worthwhile and several are highly entertaining. Many of the comments touch on the political, social and other factors that cause pension funds and other institutional investors - all purportedly "sophisticated" - to say yes to private equity investing.

Thursday, July 29, 2010

Department of Labor Adopts New "Interim Final Rule" for Greater Transparency in 401(k) Plan Fees and Pension Plan Fees

Understanding the fees that employee benefit plan vendors receive for their services has become complicated. The Department of Labor has adopted an "interim final rule" intended to result in better disclosure about these fees.

The Department expects benefits from the new rule "would result from reduced time and cost for fiduciaries to obtain compensation information needed to fulfill their fiduciary duties, the discouragement of harmful conflicts of interest, reduced information gaps, improved decision-making by fiduciaries about plan services, enhanced value for plan participants, and increased ability to redress abuses committed by service providers." The Department's fact sheet about the new "interim final rule" is linked below:

http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsimprovedfeedisclosure.html

A news account ("A Step Toward More Clarity in 401(k) Fees") is linked below:

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/your-money/401ks-and-similar-plans/24money.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=loeper%20labor&st=cse
Of note in the news account is a spot-on quote from David B. Loeper, author of “Stop the Retirement Rip-Off: How to Avoid Hidden Fees and Keep More of Your Money” (Wiley, 2009). Loeper is also the author of "Stop the Investing Rip-Off: How to Avoid Being a Victim and Make More Money" (Wiley, 2009). The latter book covers investments and "investment vendors" generally - i.e., more than just retirement account fees and other costs - and is excellent and recommended.

Saturday, July 24, 2010

SEC Proposes to Better Protect Mutual Fund Investors From Fees

On Wednesday the SEC proposed new rules intended to improve the transparency of mutual fund investors' payments of fees for funds' marketing and selling costs. (The payments are indirect, occurring via deductions from funds' assets.) The SEC also proposes to limit these fees in certain circumstances.

The fees totalled a few million dollars thirty years ago, when the fees were first permitted. In 2007 alone the fees, which are ongoing (aka never-ending), totalled $13 billion, or approximately $40 for every woman, man, and child in America. Given the sums involved, expect a ferocious effort by the mutual fund industry to neuter the proposals.

A relatively simple topic has become overcomplicated: the SEC proposal is 278 pages long. Although the SEC is moving in the right direction, avoid the fees and their complexities: when buying mutual funds stick to true no-load funds that also don't assess investors for the funds' marketing and selling costs.

August 1, 2010 supplement: see also a related article ("Small Step on Small Fees, but Big Charges Remain") at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/01/your-money/01stra.html?scp=1&sq=small%20step&st=cse

Monday, July 5, 2010

SEC Attempts to Curb "Pay-to-Play" in Public Pensions

George Bernard Shaw remarked that every profession is a conspiracy against the laity. On Wednesday the SEC acted to curb "pay-to-play" conspiracies of investment advisers and politicians against public pension plan participants. In a typical adviser-politician conspiracy, often involving intermediaries, an adviser benefits through increased "assets under management" and resulting fees. A politician receives the adviser's contributions - the mother's milk of politics. And pensioners bear both costs.

Per SEC Chair Shapiro, "[p]ay to play distorts ... the process by which investment managers are selected. It can mean that public plans and their beneficiaries receive sub-par advisory performance at a premium price." [Emphasis added.]

"The cost of this practice is borne by retired teachers, firefighters and other government employees relying on expected pension benefits ... . And, ultimately, this cost can be borne by taxpayers, who may have to make up shortfalls when vested obligations cannot be met."

Ms. Shapiro stated that pay-to-play is unspoken, entrenched, and well-understood. Noting recent SEC enforcement actions involving pay-to-play, she continued: "[o]ur recent cases may represent just the tip of the iceberg."

www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch063010mls.htm

Thursday, May 20, 2010

More on Reducing Fees Associated With Private Equity

Here's an excellent article on reducing fees associated with private equity investments. The articles addresses direct savings, as well as savings resulting indirectly via better partnership governance and reporting:

http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2010-05-06/hudec.shtml

Sunday, May 9, 2010

CalPERS Negotiating for Lower PE fees

Following-up on the January 31st post about pension plans recently gaining negotiating leverage over PE firms investing - or seeking to invest - the plans' funds, here's a link to news last week from Pensions & Investments that CalPERS has negotiated fee reductions of $125 million (over five years) from Apollo Global Management, the PE firm run by Leon Black and colleagues:

http://www.pionline.com/article/20100503/PRINTSUB/305039998

Apparently CalPERS is seeking reduced fees from most PE firms who "run money" for CalPERS.

Two days after publication of the Pensions & Investments article, the California attorney general filed a civil lawsuit against a "placement agent" intermediary between CalPERs and Apollo. (The "placement agent" is a former CalPERS board member.) The lawsuit alleges that the "placement agent's" firm received more than $45 million in undisclosed commissions from money managers in connection with CalPERS investment business over a four year period beginning in 2005. Here's a link to a WSJ article about the lawsuit:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704370704575228431185782698.html?mod=WSJ_latestheadlines

Sunday, April 11, 2010

Investment Banks Sometimes Have Conflicts? (Was World War II A Conflict?)

Vignette #1, several years ago: A large client company engaged a then-name brand investment bank, now defunct, to assist with the company's sale. Conventional terms: the bank would be paid a fee at closing based on a percentage of the sales proceeds. After a few meetings with a prospective buyer negotiations reached an impasse over price and several material terms.

Shortly after impasse the lead investment banker called the client stating that the prospective buyer wanted to renew negotiations, would "come off" its negotiating position, and wanted to meet again with the client and both parties' lawyers to state its concessions and see if price and terms could then be agreed upon.

The client agreed to meet to hear the concessions. No surprise. Schedules were revised to accommodate the meeting, airplane tickets purchased, and the client's expectations for a sale to the prospective buyer revived.

At the meeting the client arrived eager to hear the forthcoming "better offer." Quickly it became obvious that the investment banker had told both parties - the client and the prospective buyer - that the other party wanted to meet and at the meeting would make concessions. Although the banker tried to finesse matters - and claimed to have misunderstood, etc. - quickly also both the client and the prospective buyer figured out the banker's ploy.

Although we couldn't get inside the investment banker's head to know his thinking exactly, our best guess was as follows. The banker, having identified no other prospective buyers likely to be able to close during the extended term of the banker's engagement, concluded that the downside of a calculated misrepresentation was more than offset by the notion that if he could get the parties in a room then there was at least some chance a deal might ensue. And a deal, of course, meant an investment banking fee - and no deal meant no fee. And if the parties were at impasse then the chance of a fee was zero. And since the client was selling itself, the prospect of a long-term relationship with the client also was zero. (We doubt that the banker's firm's reputation entered into his calculus.)

Result: a furious former client, an unhappy prospective purchaser, no deal ... and no investment banking fee. (A long, long while later the client did enter into a definitive agreement to sell itself. The mischievous investment banker had long been gone from the scene, his "stated term" and "protection period" having expired, and his having had no pre-closing contact with the buyer. Guess who faxed a letter a day before closing claiming a fee and threatening to seek to enjoin the sale if not paid?)

Vignette #2, also several years ago: Conventional terms again: the investment bank would be paid a fee at closing based on a percentage of the sales proceeds. After awhile a deal became inevitable, for reasons for which you'll just have to trust this blogger. A price, however, was fully up for negotiation. Similar to situations where real estate brokers representing sellers have diminished incentive to stretch for the last dollar, the bankers, it could be argued, did not "stretch" because the marginal benefit of doing so wasn't worth the incremental effort and incremental extra time to closing (ahem, to fee payment) that would result from the stretch.

The vignettes above come to mind as a result of Warren Buffett's 2009 letter to shareholders, touching on the sometimes significant conflicts created by customary contingent terms for investment banking advisory fees. The letter is linked below, followed by an Andrew Ross Sorkin NYT article about Mr. Buffett's view of investment banking conflicts and prescription for one type of conflict.

By the way, after dealing with investment bankers and their lawyers I have learned (after longer than it should have taken) that "it's customary" means both (1) "I don't have a plausibly logical way to justify what I want or answer your question" and (2) "this is a great deal for me and a not so good deal for your client [or you]." (This is similar to the way children learn that their mother's saying "well, we'll see" means "no.")

Letter: http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2009ltr.pdf

Article: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/02/business/02sorkin.html?dbk

A Reputational 180 (Off Topic)

Frank Rich's NYT op-ed today - about the diminished reputations of Alan Greenspan and Robert Rubin, among other topics - brings to mind Michael Hirsh's June 30, 1997 mash note of a Newsweek article (linked below). Hirsh's article was to the effect that Alan Greenspan's and Robert Rubin's contributions to the American economy were multiples greater than, say, the labor of 100 million Americans who get out of bed to go to work. Excerpts:

-" ...what so many of [Rubin's] admirers in Washington and on Wall Street now say - that he may be the best U.S. Treasury secretary in memory ... ."
-"Many think [Greenspan and Rubin] have got the world pretty much figured out ... . Wall Street vets both, Rubin and Greenspan have an unmatched feel for matching policy to market indicators."
-"No one can take credit for anything as vast and complex as a $7 trillion economy ... . But it's also natural to wonder who's running things back in the engine room. And increasingly, appreciative eyes are turning to Rubin and his monetary counterpart, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan."
-"The fact is, Rubin and Greenspan together constitute the most formidable economic management that the United States has had in memory, gushes Jeffrey Garten, dean of the Yale School of Management."

An ironic Hirsh observation in the article: "[c]learly, Rubin believes it's far too early to write his legacy.”

Hirsh's Newsweek article: www.newsweek.com/id/95894

Today's Rich New York Times op-ed: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/opinion/11rich.html

Saturday, April 3, 2010

PE Three "In the Hole" Net of Fees

"Additional research ... shows that private equity funds underperformed the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index by 3 percent annually from 1980 to 2003, after accounting for fees."

Excerpted from: www.nytimes.com/2010/04/03/business/03equity.html?ref=business

Puzzlingly absent from the NYT article is any mention of risk in absolute terms or relative to "non-alternative" investments. Adjusted for risk relative to the S&P 500, how much farther does PE lag, net of fees and on average, over the long haul? View here: significantly farther.

Tuesday, March 30, 2010

U.S. Supreme Court Ruling about Mutual Fund Fees - Jones v. Harris Advisors

Today the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Gartenberg standard articulated by a U.S. Court of Appeals in 1982 whereby "to face liability [for excessive fees] under § 36(b) [of the Investment Company Act of 1940], an investment adviser must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm's length bargaining." [Editor's note: a preview of the case was the subject of the August 17, 2009 post.]

A full analysis of today's decision, prior jurisprudence, and nuances, could fill volumes. And discourse about whether today's decision will help or hurt investors, lead to more or less litigation over excessive fees, and affect prevailing fee levels, could fill volumes, too. But here's the short version: absent egregiously avaricious circumstances the courts will not provide a practical remedy - i.e., investor protection - against investment adviser fee excesses. Neither of the other two branches of government will provide a practical remedy, either. Caveat emptor. As with many matters, one receives what one can negotiate. Regarding investment costs and fees: discern, negotiate, and protect yourself accordingly.

Tuesday, March 2, 2010

The History of Wall Street is the History of ... Scandal

The last 25 years of American investment banking and financial services have been marked largely by scandals. A top-of-mind list is below. (Please email me omitted topics that slipped my mind this morning.) During these years if not for longer the history of Wall Street has been the history of scandal. Thirty years from now the recent calamities' cause or causes will become clearer. (Historians can be incisively insightful.) For now, here's a guess: the change in form from private partnerships to publicly-held firms, such that bankers began to deal with an unseen public's money rather than colleagues' and retired former colleagues' money, plays a large part.

E. F. Hutton (check kiting); insider trading (Ivan Boesky; Dennis Levine; many more, including employees at most of the name brand houses); Drexel Burnham Lambert; NASDAQ market maker collusion lawsuit and settlement; Long-Term Capital Management; mutual fund market timing scandals; derivatives abuse (Enron et al.); IPO allocations given to win executives' companies' investment banking business; old-fashioned account churning; co-opting analysts to win investment banking assignments (prime example: Merrill Lynch); Barings; the back-channel information sharing and whisper campaigns that led to the SEC's Regulation FD; subprime mortgages; auction rate securities; pay-to-play in municipal bond underwriting; Lehman Bros. ("Repo 105"); Mergers & acquisitions advisers' conflicts of interest (see Berkshire Hathaway's CEO's most recent letter to shareholders); the American rating agencies (... "it could be structured by cows and we would rate it"); and bailouts, including of Merrill Lynch and A.I.G. and its counterparties.

How Warren Buffett Inadvertently Harms Investors

We admire Warren Buffett and wish he were a friend. He is a national treasure: a true hero, with integrity and abundant humility. According to a recent newspaper article Mr. Buffett ranks near the top of a list of the most trustworthy people in America.

He thinks and writes clearly. His annual letters to shareholders are tours de force. Anticipating his yearly doses of wisdom is like a kid waiting for the holidays. Particularly enjoyable is his irrefutable logic in spotlighting the mischievous ways of the usual Wall Street suspects.

When on occasion he addresses a matter of public policy he is incisively on target. And in terms of capital allocation - and that's how he describes his job, after all - his batting average has created and saved hundreds of thousands of jobs.

And of course his and his partner's results are unprecedented. In. The history. Of the world. In a world of many malevolent economic actors he is a unrivaled force for good.

But Mr. Buffett inadvertently and unintentionally - and totally without fault - harms investors.

How? Because due to his success and name recognition he is the almost-universal example of the preferability of actively investment management over indexing.

The logic of the example is that if there is a Buffett then nothing precludes the current or future existence of more Buffetts. And so then begins the search to find (and pay handsomely) up-and-coming index-beaters. At a cost of hundreds of billions of dollars a year, per Vanguard founder John Bogle, as noted in an earlier post on this blog.

However, citing Warren Buffett as an example of the preferability of active investment management isn't, when one looks closer, a compelling argument that the market can be beat over the long term. One, his company buys other companies typically in their entirety. And so to compare his performance to that of, say, an equity mutual fund manager isn't apples-to-apples. In other words, although he is famously "hands-off" regarding his company's portfolio companies he is still more conglomerate businessman than a stock picker. Two, even if contrary to most academic studies there really are many Warren Buffetts out there -- that is, persons with true risk-adjusted market-beating skill ("alpha") rather than persons who have had an extraordinary run of good luck -- trying to find those few persons among the millions of "financial service industry professionals" is trying to win the lottery.

Mr. Buffett himself has suggested that most people would be far better off investing in index funds. [Source: The Elements of Investing by Burton G. Malkiel and Charles D. Ellis.] Let's take Mr. Buffett's highly trustworthy suggestion.

Please note: in fairness to Mr. Buffett, literally he doesn't harm investors. It's others' references to him that cause the harm. And the harm matters.

Sunday, February 14, 2010

Other People's Money - Louis D. Brandeis

... Recently came across several references to Louis Brandeis' book "Other People's Money, and How the Bankers Use It," published in 1914. And coincidentally after beginning this post came across two more references in recent articles:

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/opinion/07urofsky.html?_r=2

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/simon-johnson/move-your-politicians_b_443852.html

Brandeis' book, which began as a series of essays, is remarkable: the wounds to the public interest caused by the "Money Trust" (Brandeis' label for what today is bulge bracket Wall Street) are still being inflicted.

Chapter V ("What Publicity Can Do") is good reading for those interested in this blog's main point. (The book's full text is online.) In the chapter Brandeis prescribes disclosure for the ills of concentrated financial resources, especially the ill of excessive underwriters' compensation.

In the decades that followed the book's publications securities laws mandated the disclosure ("publicity") Brandeis envisioned, and self-regulatory agencies (such as the NASD, now known as FINRA) arguably addressed excessive underwriters' compensation. However, the pathologies Brandeis describes have survived for nearly a century despite disclosure and self-regulation. A few Chapter V excerpts are below:

-"But a main cause of ... [bankers'] large fortunes is the huge tolls taken by those who control the avenues to capital and to investors. There has been exacted as toll literally 'all that the traffic will bear'."

-"It is to exactions such as these [referring to Brandeis' description of J.P. Morgan & Co.'s "monster commissions" of the era] that the wealth of the investment banker is in large part due."

-"The question may be asked: Why have these excessive charges been submitted to? Corporations, which in the first instance bear the charges for capital, have, doubtless, submitted because of banker-control ... exercised ... indirectly through combinations among bankers to suppress competition. But why have the investors submitted, since ultimately all these charges are borne by the investors, except so far as corporations succeed in shifting the burden upon the community? ... Their submission is undoubtedly due, in part, to the fact that the bankers control the avenues to recognizedly safe investments almost as fully as they do the avenues to capital."

-And for good measure, from Chapter VI ("Where the Banker is Superfluous"): "But the investment banker has, within his legitimate province, acquired control so extensive as to menace the public welfare even where his business is properly conducted."

Saturday, February 6, 2010

"All the Serious Money is Indexed"

Linked below is a New York Times article about Professor Malkiel's new book The Elements of Investing and about the professor's recommendation of indexing. The article also touches on the professor's views about fees, especially hedge fund fees, and on the fee "load" of actively managed funds.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/06/your-money/stocks-and-bonds/06wealth.html?em=&pagewanted=print

Wednesday, February 3, 2010

What A Difference [One Percent] A Year Makes

1. "If you could lower fees in your 401(k) by 1 percent throughout your working years, you could as much as double your account balance by the time you retire," said Kristi Mitchem, a managing director at BlackRock Inc., a mutual fund provider. Article at: http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/01/26/business/AP-US-Markets-More-401K-Fees.html

2. Another way to view the long-term effect of investment fees: say a prudent withdrawal rate is 4% per year. The savings to which withdrawals are applied result from hard work and have run a gauntlet of the cost of living, family obligations, deferred gratification and, significantly, taxes. With respect to investment costs of a 1% per year and assuming a desire to leave principal untouched, for your heirs, why pay to another 25% percent of the "life estate" fruits of your labor? In terms of years – say, a 40 year working career – what justifies paying another the equivalent of 10 years' worth of the fruits of a career's labor?

3. William Bernstein, in "Investors Manifesto," gives an example of how over time a broker extracting fees of 3% per year will have accumulated more value from a given investor's account than the investor retains in total. In the example the investor's return is the S&P 500 return less the 3% per year in fees and the broker's return results from investing the fees collected from the investor in a low cost S&P 500 index fund.

Sunday, January 31, 2010

Fees, Fees - It's all about the Fees

Investors are gaining negotiating power:

http://www.pionline.com/article/20091116/PRINTSUB/311169948

U.S. Supreme Court hints at a forthcoming decision about money manager fees (and for more on this court case please see the August 17th post):

http://www.pionline.com/article/20091116/PRINTSUB/311169946

Saturday, January 2, 2010

The Investor's Manifesto - William Bernstein - Book Review

The Investor's Manifesto is a short, excellent, and highly readable book by noted financial author William Bernstein. (You may have read Bernstein's The Intelligent Asset Allocator or The Four Pillars of Investing.)

The Manifesto's main points include that selecting individual stocks is folly and that successful investing requires four elements: keen interest in the subject, an understanding of financial history, math skills, and the emotional discipline to minimize the biases - including the sometimes serious self-inflicted wounds - psychologically hard-wired into most investors. For example, desires for narratives frequently oversimplify complex events and create perceived patterns out of randomness. That Bernstein is a neurologist allows him to add insight and good value here.

An additional main point is that nearly all American brokerage firms add little or no net value to their retail clients and cannot be said to have their clients' interests as first priority. Reducing investment costs receives Bernstein's attention directly in a spot-on chapter titled "Muggers and Worse." Comments on investment costs are also sprinkled throughout other chapters: "[o]bserve the private jets and eight-figure bonuses of brokerage executives, paid for by you, and the sub-par returns earned for you by these [executives] ... . If you find yourself sitting, literally or figuratively, in a large, leather-and-mahogany-filled office across from someone who flies private from vacation house to vacation house, pivot 180 degrees and run like hell." The chapter's concluding summary: "[y]ou are engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the financial services industry. ... If you act on the assumption that every broker, insurance salesman ... and financial advisor you encounter is a hardened criminal, you will do just fine."

The book likely will stand the test of time and become an investment classic. We say "likely will" rather than "will" because several references to the capital market events of 2007-2009 may in the future cause the book to appear outdated - a malady common to most books on capital markets. However, 2007-2009 capital markets events are so significant and so skillfully used by Bernstein as examples that the references are justified fully. (On the other hand, (1) the short interval between the rescue of Long-Term Capital Management and the recent federal bailouts for which the rescue was a harbinger, and (2) prospects for federal financial/banking regulatory reform, suggest the possible of a sooner-than-you-might-think, similar crisis. (This is similar to the 100-year flood that occurs every few years.) If and when such a crisis occurs then its events may date the book slightly in its broader, long-term appeal, which is unfortunate since much of the book's content is timeless.

Note that syndicated financial columnist Scott Burns recently published a column about the book; Burns is among those receiving the author's acknowledgments.

Bernstein's concise book has excellent endnotes for readers wanting more details and "jumping off points." Bernstein also does an excellent job "cordoning off" the math - readers who want the math can plow through it; readers who don't aren't interrupted. The book also includes an excellent short chapter on investment books Bernstein recommends, most of which are or will be classics.

Sunday, October 11, 2009

Why Underwriting Spreads Haven't Yet Been Competed Away

Here's an article with good insight into why the household name investment banks have a tough-to-open "lock" on securities underwriting and other, related business:

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/10/why-goldman-always-wins/7653/